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This paper uses data from surveys of expected inflation to learn how expectations processes have 
changed following recent changes in the behavior of inflation.  Households do not appear to have 
recognized the change in the process, and are placing substantially more weight than appears 
warranted on recent inflation data when forming expectations about inflation over the next year.  
At first glance, professional forecasters do appear to have changed how they predict inflation.  
But a closer look at the data reveals that professionals are relying on core rather than headline 
inflation, and are placing too much weight on recent core inflation data.  These errors show up in 











* I would like to thank Oscar Jorda and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.  Wayne 
Huang and Puneet Chehal provided high quality research assistance.  Any opinions expressed in 
this paper are those of the author and not those of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco or 
the Federal Reserve System. 1 
 
 In the first half of 2008, some U.S. surveys showed noticeable increases in expected 
inflation, leading to concerns about a possible increase in the inflation rate and about the 
credibility of the Federal Reserve.  Such concerns can be justified on the basis of a number of 
recent studies.  For instance, Ang, Bekaert and Wei (2007) show that survey measures of 
expected inflation provide better forecasts of inflation than any other alternative that they 
consider, including about a dozen variants each of Phillips curve and term structure models, as 
well as simple regime switching models.  Mehra and Herrington (2008) use a VAR specified by 
Leduc, Sill and Stark (2007) to examine measures of survey expectations following the change in 
the monetary policy regime that took place around the end of the 1970s.   They find that the 
expectations process changed in a way that is consistent with the change in the inflation process 
that took place at about the same time, suggesting that survey participants are able to detect 
changes in the inflation process relatively quickly.
1  And Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen 
(2001) discuss how the behavior of survey forecasts relative to the monetary authority’s inflation 
target provides information about credibility.
2 
Though the rationality of survey forecasts  has been debated (see Croushore, 1998, for a 
discussion and a defense), they are generally well regarded, especially the forecasts made by the 
professionals.  For instance, Carrol (2003) argues that forecasts from the Society of Professional 
Forecasters pass all the important tests for rationality and goes on to model households’ forecasts 
as adjusting gradually to the forecasts of professionals.  Ang, et. al., (ABW) are positive about 
both household and professional forecasts:  “That the median Livingston and SPF forecasts do 
well is perhaps not surprising…However, even participants in the Michigan surveys who are 
consumers, not professionals, produce accurate out-of-sample forecasts, which are only slightly 
worse than those of the professionals.”  They go on to speculate that the superior performance of 
the professionals may result from their ability to recognize structural change more quickly than 
mechanical model forecasts can. 
This paper argues that neither households nor professional forecasters are quite as 
sophisticated as these arguments make them out to be.  The evidence suggests that there have 
                                                 
1 There is a debate about the nature of the change in the inflation process that took place at this time.  This  issue is 
taken up below. 
2 This in no way exhausts the list of uses to which inflation survey data have been put.  For instance, Mankiw, Reis 
and Wolfers (2003) and Orphanides and Williams (2005) use these data to inform aspects of model specification.  
For an extensive discussion of how various kinds of survey data are used for modeling expectations and testing 
hypotheses about expectations formation see Pesaran and Weale (2006). 2 
 
been some changes in the inflation process in recent years, but neither households nor 
professionals have responded appropriately so far. 
  More specifically, the evidence suggests that the inflation process has become noticeably 
less persistent since the beginning of the decade.  As with the change in the inflation process 
around the end of the 1970s, this change could be modeled as a change in the autoregressive 
coefficients of the inflation process or as a change in the variance of the shocks to the process.  
In either case, as argued below, the change in the inflation process should show up as a change in 
the relationship between survey expectations data and realized inflation.   But the survey data 
suggest that there has been little, if any, change at all in the way that households react to inflation 
data.  In particular, it appears that households are placing too large a weight on recent inflation 
data when forming expectations.  Consistent with this finding, household forecasts of inflation 
are now about the worst of all the alternatives considered below.  This contrasts sharply with 
Ang, et al (2007), who find that--over an earlier sample--household forecasts are among the best.  
  Professional forecasters, on the other hand, do appear to have changed how they react to 
recent inflation data, but this change is not fully consistent with the observed change in the 
inflation process.  Specifically, professionals seem to be paying less attention to headline 
inflation data but are still relying heavily on core inflation data.   This is consistent with the 
position advocated by Blinder and Reis (2005) that it is better to predict headline inflation using 
lagged core --- rather than headline --- inflation.  It turns out, however, that SPF forecasts of 
headline inflation have deteriorated in recent years as well, and are now worse than forecasts 
based on lagged headline inflation alone.  Surprisingly, SPF forecasts of headline inflation are 
rather good forecasts of core inflation, which suggests that the professionals may now be 
implicitly forecasting the core CPI, instead of the headline CPI (which is what they are asked to 
forecast).   Such a switch would be consistent with the argument put forward by Blinder and Reis 
(henceforth BR) that then-Chairman Greenspan’s advocacy of the core inflation concept has 
shifted U.S. public discourse about inflation from headline to core inflation.  
If professional forecasters have indeed begun to pay more attention to core CPI because 
of Chairman Greenspan’s advocacy, then this switch provides unusual evidence on the Federal 
Reserve’s (Fed’s) credibility.
3  This finding can also be seen as augmenting the findings of 
                                                 
3 The SPF forecasts provide more conventional evidence of Fed credibility as well: The 10-year ahead inflation 
forecast has been quite stable for more than 10 years now. 3 
 
Orphanides and Williams, whose analysis suggests that the professional forecasters are backward 
looking (as their forecasts can be approximated with a Kalman filtered version of past inflation 
data).  Our results suggest that the professionals are sensitive to other aspects of the environment 
as well, though this may not always lead to improved forecast accuracy. 
 
 
1. The data 
The Survey of Consumers was initiated in 1946 and is currently conducted monthly by the 
University of Michigan’s Survey Research Center.   Each month, a randomly selected sample of 
approximately 500 American households are asked (in telephone interviews) about expected 
changes to key macroeconomic variables such as inflation, interest rates, and unemployment.  
The sample is designed to be “rotating,” in that for any one survey, approximately 60% of 
respondents are new and the remaining 40% of respondents are interviewed for a second time.      
Since 1977, respondents have been asked the following question about inflation: 
“By about what percent do you expect prices to go (up/down) on the average, during the next 12 
months?” 
Continuous monthly data on the answers to this question are available since January 1978.  
Quarterly data are available prior to that, but not for every quarter; these data are not used here.    
  The Survey of Professional Forecasters was first conducted in the fourth quarter of 1968 
by the American Statistical Association and the National Bureau of Economic Research.  It has 
been conducted by the Philadelphia Fed since the second quarter of 1990.  Sample size has 
varied noticeably over time; as of this writing, their website identifies more than 50 respondents 
and there are some anonymous respondents as well. Beginning in 1981Q3, participants were 
asked to forecast quarterly and annual CPI.  
  Since the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) is only conducted once a quarter, the 
analysis of the data from the consumer survey is carried out at a quarterly frequency as well.  For 
the consumer survey, I use data from the third month of each quarter.  The implications of this 
choice for various forecast comparisons are discussed below. 
  Figure 1 plots data on expected inflation over the next year from both the Michigan and 
the SPF surveys.  In recent years, the SPF forecasts have been perceptibly below the expectations 
from the Michigan survey.  Also noticeable is the increased volatility of the Michigan 




2. The household survey of expected inflation 
Do survey respondents use the information in recent inflation data in ways that are consistent 
with the inflation process?  To answer this question, two projections are compared: the 
projection of expected inflation on recent inflation data and the projection of actual inflation over 
the same horizon on recent inflation data.   Changes over time in the latter provide information 
about how the inflation process has changed.  The next step is to determine whether the 
projections involving inflation expectations show similar changes.
4 
  The starting point is a regression of CPI inflation over the next year on the inflation rate 
for the current quarter and 7 lags.  The estimated equation is 
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where  4 ,  t t   measures inflation from t to t+4, i.e., over the next year, which is the same horizon 
as in the Michigan survey.  Quarterly data are used here to allow for easy comparison with the 
results for the SPF forecasts below. Very similar results were obtained when the lag length was 
varied by four, when monthly data were used instead of quarterly, and when a four quarter 
average of inflation was used as the explanatory variable.   
  The first column of Figure 2 shows that it has become harder to predict future inflation 
over time.  Each point on the middle line plotted in the upper left hand panel of Figure 2 is the 
value of ∑   
 
     (that is, the sum of the coefficients on inflation) when the regression described 
above is estimated over a 15-year window that ends in the quarter against which the point is 
plotted.  Also shown are two-standard-error bands, based on HAC standard errors.  The lower 
left hand panel shows how the fit of this equation changes over time. Taken together, the two 
panels in the first column reveal that contemporaneous and lagged inflation data contain less and 
less information about future inflation as time goes on.  For sample periods whose endpoint lies 
within the last two or three years, the point estimate (that is, ∑   
 
    )  is noticeably below zero, 
and even the upper bound of the confidence interval is not too far above zero.  Furthermore, the 
the adjusted-R
2 is negative or close to zero since the beginning of 2005.   Though uneven, the 
                                                 
4 Under the maintained assumption that inflation is an autoregressive process, Pesando (1975) argues that if 
expectations are rational, the corresponding coefficients in the two regressions should be equal.  Mullineaux (1980) 
projects expected inflation on lagged inflation and money growth and examines how the coefficients evolve over 
time. 5 
 
decline appears to have taken place in two steps; first, over the first half of the 1990s and the 
second over the last five years or so of the sample.  The first decline appears related to the early 
1980s dropping out of the sample; for instance, if a 10-year rolling window is used in place of a 
15-year window, the first drop in the sum of the coefficients is complete by the early 1990s, 
instead of the additional 5 years or so that it takes in the plot shown in Figure 2.  These results 
suggest a decline in the persistence of inflation, though the left hand side variable is not what 
traditionally would be used in a regression meant to examine changes in persistence.
5 
  The second column of Figure 2 shows what happens when the exercise above is repeated 
using the following equation: 
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where  4 ,  t t
M
t E   denotes the 1-year-ahead expected inflation from the Michigan survey.
6  The top 
panel on the right hand side shows that while the sum of lagged coefficients did decline in the 
mid-1990s (just as is the case in the panel on the left hand side), there is no evidence of any 
decline since the late 1990s.  Instead, over the last few years the sum of lagged coefficients 
actually increased, so that one would be hard pressed to say that the sum of the coefficients at the 
end of the sample is any different from what it was in the beginning of the sample.  Thus, it 
appears that---when forming expectations about inflation over the next year---households have 
continued to place a large weight upon recent inflation data till the very end of the sample.  The 
adjusted-R
2 does show a decline towards the end of the sample, but is still substantial and quite a 
bit higher than what is obtained in the case of realized inflation. 
  More formal tests on the stability of the two equations provide consistent results.   Table 
1 shows how the coefficients in equations (1) and (2) change over the two halves of the 1978Q1-
2009Q3 sample.   Specifically, a dummy variable that is 0 until the end of 1993 and 1 afterwards 
is included both by itself and after being interacted with the inflation terms.  In the first column 
(where realized inflation is the dependent variable), the sum of the coefficients on the inflation 
                                                 
5Regressing 1-quarter-ahead  inflation on current and lagged quarterly inflation (which would be the traditional 
specification) leads to results that are very close to those shown in Chart 2. 
6 In view of the distinction between core and headline inflation that comes up when the SPF forecasts are examined 
below, it is worth noting that no evidence was found to suggest that household inflation expectations are more (or 
less) sensitive to oil or food prices than to other kinds of inflation.  More specifically, terms representing  increases 
in the price of oil, the price of food or the level of non-core inflation (as defined below) were almost always 
insignificant at the 10 percent level when included in equation (2).  6 
 
terms interacted with the dummy (that is, the DPi terms) is significantly negative, implying a 
significant decline in the inflation coefficients over the second half of the sample.   Further, the 
null hypothesis that these terms can be dropped from the equation can be rejected at the 1 percent 
level.  Notably, the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients on all the inflation terms is zero in 
the second half of the sample cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level, though it can be rejected 
at the 10 percent level.  The results for the expected inflation equation are quite different.  
Although the sum of the coefficients on inflation during the first half of the sample is close to 
that for the first equation, the results for the second half are very different.   Most importantly, 
one cannot reject the hypothesis that there has been no change in the sum of these coefficients 
over the second half of the sample at conventional significance levels.  And one can clearly 
reject the hypothesis that the sum of coefficients on all the inflation terms is zero in the second 
sample (that is, one can easily reject the hypothesis that ΣPi  + ΣDPi = 0). 
  An alternative procedure to test the stability of the equations is to use the Bai-Perron 
tests, where both the dates of the breaks and the number of breaks are assumed to be unknown.
 7  
For the realized inflation regression, the WDMax test statistic is 130.2, compared to a 1 percent 
critical value of 24.8.  Thus, the null of no break is decisively rejected.  The sequential test finds 
four breaks at the five percent level: in 1981Q1, 1986Q1, 2004Q2 and 1990Q2 (in that order).  In 
contrast, for the expected inflation regression, the value of  the WDMax statistic is 15.8, 
compared to a 10 percent critical value of 18.1.  And the sequential test finds no breaks at the 10 
percent level. Thus, the results from the Bai-Perron tests reinforce the findings in Table 1. 
A straightforward interpretation of the decline in the sum of the coefficients on lagged 
inflation shown in the first column of Figure 2 is that inflation is becoming less persistent over 
time, with a noticeable change in persistence having taken place in the early part of this decade.    
Given this result, the second column of charts suggests that in forming expectations about 
inflation over the next year, households are placing substantially more weight than they should 
on recent quarterly inflation data.
8 
                                                 
7 These tests are discussed in Bai and Perron (1998). 
8 Longer term consumer inflation expectations also appear to be excessively sensitive to recent inflation data.  When 
expected inflation over the 5-to-10 year horizon is regressed on the current and 7 lags of quarterly inflation (for a 
15-year rolling window whose right end point moves from 2004 to 2009), the sum of the coefficients is positive and 
always significantly different from zero.  By contrast, in the regression for actual inflation over the same horizon, 
the sum of coefficients on quarterly inflation is always negative and significantly different from zero for the last 10 
years or so.  Because of data availability, the two sets of regressions do not span exactly the same period.  Over the 
roughly 10-year overlapping sample period, the regression with realized inflation as the dependent variable has an 7 
 
  The recent decline in inflation persistence could well be part of a trend of declining 
persistence that has been in place since the 1980s.  Among others, Taylor (2000), Cogley and 
Sargent (2005) and Levin and Piger (2004) have argued that the persistence of inflation has 
declined.  Along the same lines, Blanchard and Gali (2007) and Mishkin (2007) argue that there 
has been a change in the way inflation responds to shocks.  And, as noted above, both Leduc, Sill 
and Stark (2007) and Mehra and Herrington (2008) conclude that (roughly) since the 1980s, U.S. 
inflation has been a stationary process.   
  Many of these authors have suggested that the change in the inflation process represents a 
change in the conduct of policy.  But there has been considerable debate about this.  As pointed 
out by Sims (1999), what appears to be time variation in the estimated coefficients could really 
be the result of changes in the shocks hitting the system; this argument has been elaborated in 
Sims and Zha (2006).   Using the Cogley-Sargent technology, Clark and Nakata conclude that a 
reduction in the size of the shocks hitting the economy is largely responsible for the reduction in 
the volatility of inflation and inflation expectations in recent years.  In a similar vein, Pivetta and 
Reis (2007) argue that inflation persistence has not changed much over the postwar period 
because there has been little change in the size of the largest root in the inflation process since 
the 1960s.  Stock and Watson (2007) provide a reconciliation of these findings in a model where 
inflation has both a permanent and a temporary component.  In this model, a reduction in the 
variance of the innovation to the permanent component implies that a given change in inflation is 
more likely to be reversed than before, even though there has been no change in the largest root 
of the process. 
  The Stock and Watson (SW) model provides a characterization of the inflation process 
which is very different from the univariate autoregressions presented above.  (According to SW, 
“The time-varying trend-cycle model is equivalent to a time-varying first-order integrated 
moving average (IMA(1,1)) model for inflation, in which the magnitude of the MA coefficient 
varies inversely with the ratio of the permanent to the transitory disturbance variance,” p. 4) It is 
therefore interesting to see how their specification interprets recent changes in the inflation 
process.   SW postulate a model in which inflation has two components: a stochastic permanent 
component and a serially uncorrelated temporary component.  The variance of the disturbance 
                                                                                                                                                             
adjusted-R
2 of 0.13 with the sum of inflation coefficients equal to -0.14 while the regression for the Michigan survey 
data has an adjusted-R
2 of 0.92 and the sum of inflation coefficients is 0.48.  8 
 
terms is allowed to change over time.  Specifically, their (unobserved components-stochastic 
volatility) model is given by: 
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where  ) , ( , , t t t       is i.i.d. N(0,I2) and   ) , ( , , t t t       is i.i.d. N(0, I2).  t   and  t   are 
independently distributed, and   is a scalar parameter. 
  The estimates of   t ,    and  t ,    (the standard deviations of the shocks to the temporary 
and permanent components) are plotted in Figure 3, together with an estimate of  t  , the 
permanent component of inflation.   As pointed out by SW, the standard deviation of the 
permanent component of inflation (shown in the middle panel) rose significantly from the 1960s 
to the early 1980s, before declining sharply over the remainder of that decade.  It has moved very 
little since the mid-1990s.  The standard deviation of the temporary component has moved in 
almost the opposite way; it did not move around very much prior to 2000, especially when 
compared to the permanent component.   However, it has risen sharply since the beginning of 
this decade.  By the end of the sample, it is more than six times as large as the contemporaneous 
standard deviation of the permanent component, and nearly twice as large as the maximum 
attained by the latter in the early 1980s. 
    As discussed by SW, the decline in the persistence of inflation after 1980 can be 
explained by the drop in the variance of the permanent component; as this variance declined over 
the second half of the 1980s and the early 1990s, movements in CPI inflation came to be 
dominated by the temporary component.   Inflation became harder to forecast, even as the 
variance of inflation was falling.  The relative importance of the permanent component has fallen 
even further in this decade—thus making inflation even harder to forecast—but that’s happened 
because the variance of the temporary component has increased sharply.
9 
                                                 
9 The finding that the increase in variability is concentrated at the high frequencies does not hinge upon the 
functional form that is imposed upon the inflation process, but is evident in the raw inflation data itself.  For 
instance, if a 10-year rolling window is used to calculate the variance of monthly inflation, there is a noticeable drop 
in the variance of inflation beginning (with samples that end) in the mid-1990s (which is the same time that the 9 
 
Assume, now, that the only change that has taken place in the inflation process recently is 
an increase in the variance of the temporary component.  Intuitively, this means that the current 
level of inflation has become a more noisy indicator of future inflation than before.  The 
literature on inference suggests that when a signal becomes more noisy one should pay less 
attention to it. 
To see how this intuition applies to the case at hand, suppose (first) that the inflation 
process is given by the Stock-Watson specification.  For simplicity, also assume that households 
know the inflation process and the current period temporary shock.  Expected inflation next 
period is then given by: 
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Regressing this forecast of next period’s inflation rate on today’s inflation rate (an exercise 
similar to regression (2) above) leads to the following estimated coefficient: 
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where t is the sample size.  For the fixed sample size used in the rolling regressions above, this 
coefficient will decline as the variance of the temporary component (η) increases.  Alternatively, 
if one assumes that the long lived component of inflation is autoregressive of order one with a 
root 1/α that is close to, but not equal to, one, regressing the inflation rate expected to prevail 
next period on today’s inflation rate leads to the coefficient 
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which, again, will be smaller in a regime where the variance of the temporary shock is higher. 
Thus, even if the change in the inflation process is better modeled as an increase in the variance 
                                                                                                                                                             
regression coefficients change in the charts above), followed by an  increase that begins in the early 2000s.  This 
increase is much more obvious when one looks at the difference of inflation (which tends to emphasize higher 
frequency movements), and by the end of the sample the variance is slightly above the highs of the 1980s .  When 
the same exercise is repeated at the annual frequency, there is only a very small increase in the variance of either 
inflation or the difference of inflation at the very end of the sample.
  The results at the quarterly frequency lie in 
between. 10 
 
of the temporary component, the sum of coefficients plotted in the top panel on the right hand 
side of Figure 2 should decline over time. 
 
 
3. The forecasts from the SPF survey 
This section examines the forecasts from the survey of professional forecasters.  The left hand 
column of charts in Figure 4 repeats –for the SPF forecasts--the exercise seen in Figure 2 above, 
that is, it shows what happens when the year-ahead SPF inflation forecasts are regressed on 
current and lagged inflation.  The results turn out to be similar to those for actual inflation (see 
the left hand column in Figure 2).  Thus, the forecasters in the SPF panel appear to be placing 
less weight on recent inflation data, and one could conclude that the professionals have 
recognized the change that has taken place in the inflation process, much as hypothesized by 
ABW. 
   However, a closer look at the data reveals that there is another dimension along which the 
forecasters’ behavior looks quite different.  The charts on the right hand side of Figure 4 show 
what happens when the SPF forecasts are projected on core CPI inflation data.  If anything, the 
SPF forecasts have become more sensitive to core CPI data in recent years, though---given the 
size of the two-standard-error band--- one cannot reject the argument that there has been no 
change in their response to these data over the entire sample.   Table 2 provides more direct 
evidence on these issues.  The first column presents the estimates from a full sample regression 
of the SPF forecasts on quarterly CPI inflation, in which the constant and the coefficients on the 
inflation terms are allowed to change approximately midway through the sample (specifically, at 
the end of 1993, to allow comparison with the results in Table 1).  The sum of the coefficients on 
the inflation terms interacted with the dummy variable is negative and significantly different 
from zero.  As indicated at the bottom of the table, these variables cannot be excluded from the 
equation at the one percent level.  And one cannot reject the hypothesis that during the second 
half of the sample, changes in CPI inflation have no permanent effect on the SPF forecasts.   The 
results in the second column, where the SPF forecast is regressed on core CPI inflation, are quite 
different from those in the first.  The coefficients on the inflation terms that have been interacted 
with the dummy are insignificantly different from zero and one can easily reject the hypothesis 
that the sum of all the coefficients on the core inflation terms is zero in the second half of the 11 
 
sample.  Note that the fit of this equation is marginally better than the first, in which the forecasts 
are projected on headline inflation measures. 
  One way to reconcile these results is to argue that the SPF forecasters used to pay 
attention to both the core and non-core components of inflation until recently and now pay 
attention only to the former. An alternative argument is that the SPF forecasters always paid 
attention to the core CPI and not the headline, but this has only become obvious following the 
recent decline in the correlation between core and headline CPI inflation.  I discuss each of these 
possibilities in turn.  Before doing so, it is worth noting the results of an experiment meant to 
distinguish between the two.  Specifically, the exercise in Figure 4 was repeated, except that the 
core and non-core
10 components of CPI inflation were entered separately.   It turns out that while 
the noncore inflation terms did not account for much of the variation in the SPF forecast, they 
could not be excluded from the SPF regression for samples that end before 2002; after that, the 
evidence is mixed, with the noncore components significant for some samples and not others. 
  Why might the professional forecasters have reduced the attention they pay to the 
noncore component?  One possible reason is that the increased noise identified earlier in the CPI 
is concentrated in this component, which would suggest that one should reduce the weight one 
attaches to the noncore component but continue to pay attention to the core inflation rate. 
  In order to see if the data are consistent with this hypothesis, Figure 5 shows the results 
obtained when the SW specification is imposed upon the core CPI inflation process.   The 
decline in the variance of the permanent component is similar to that seen in the case of the 
headline CPI.   Importantly, while the variance of the temporary component has been going up 
recently, the increase is nowhere near as marked as it was for headline CPI inflation.
11 
  Thus, an argument can be made that because of recent changes in the inflation process, it 
is appropriate to pay less attention to the non-core component of CPI inflation.
12  But that does 
not justify the SPF forecasters practice of continuing to place a large weight on core inflation 
data when predicting headline inflation.  The first column in Figure 6 demonstrates this point.  It 
                                                 
10 Non-core inflation is defined as the rate of headline inflation relative to core, following Stock and Watson (2008). 
11 In contrast to the headline CPI (see footnote 9), the raw data for core CPI do not provide clear evidence of 
changes in volatility.  
12 Even in this case, the practice of placing a zero weight on food and energy price data is hard to justify.  First, it 
ignores the dynamics of the known temporary component, which is unlikely to be white noise.  More problematic is 
the assumption of independence between the core and non-core components.  Specifically, the non-core component 
will affect the core component (given the range of historical responses of monetary policy to such shocks); e.g., oil 
shocks are likely to affect other prices in the economy and so should be taken into account. 12 
 
shows what happens when headline CPI inflation over the next year is regressed upon core CPI 
inflation, similar to the rolling regressions seen earlier.  As can be seen, the relationship between 
headline and core inflation has deteriorated quite noticeably in recent years.  For samples ending 
in the last four to five years, core CPI inflation data provide no information about future headline 
inflation, which is almost exactly the same result shown in Figure 2--where the right hand side 
variable was headline CPI inflation.  This result could not be more different from that in Figure 
4, where the SPF forecasts of headline inflation appear to have become more sensitive to core 
inflation data in recent years. 
  These results make one wonder whether it is only the relationship between headline and 
core inflation that has changed or if there has been a change in the behavior of core inflation as 
well.  The panels on the right hand side of Figure 6 address this issue by regressing 1-year-ahead 
core CPI inflation on quarterly core CPI inflation.  While the deterioration in the predictive 
power of the equation is not as great as when headline CPI inflation is regressed on itself (see 
Figure 2), the pattern is similar.  The relationship begins to deteriorate by the mid-2000s; by the 
end of the sample period, the sum of the coefficients on inflation cannot be distinguished from 
zero and the adjusted-R
2 is below 0.1.  The data suggest that these regressions could look worse 
as time goes by; when a 10-year rolling window is used (instead of the 15-year window used for 
the graphs), the sum of the coefficients on core inflation falls below zero in 2006 and continues 
to fall through the end of the sample. 
  As mentioned above, the other possibility is that the SPF forecasters have always relied 
on core inflation to forecast headline inflation, but this has only become obvious following the 
recent change in the relationship between the two.  The SPF forecasters would not be unique in 
following such a procedure, if this is indeed what they were doing.  For instance, Blinder and 
Reis (BR, 2005) argue that even if one is interested in headline inflation, it is better to generate 
forecasts of this variable by using data on core inflation.  Based on a series of results for 
forecasting inflation at the 6, 12, 24 and 36 month forecasting horizons, they state that: 
 
“Every specification in the table points to the same conclusion: that recent core inflation is a 
better predictor of future headline inflation than is recent headline inflation…. Indeed, once you 
take core inflation into account, adding headline inflation has at best no effect on forecasting 
performance, and at most horizons makes forecasts even worse.” 
 13 
 
So, one could argue that the forecasters’ decision to focus on core inflation was a reflection of 
prevailing opinion.
13  But, even if this was the right way to proceed in the past, should the 
forecasters have continued to do so in light of the evidence above? 
  Table 3 provides a comparison of different ways of forecasting CPI inflation since the 
beginning of 2003, which is just after the ABW (2007) sample ends and close to the time that the 
inflation process appears to have changed.   The Michigan and SPF forecasts are compared to 
forecasts from several alternative specifications: A random walk, Stock and Watson’s 
unobserved-component stochastic-volatility model, and three regression based specifications.  
Two of the regressions involve only inflation data (either headline or core) while the third is a 
Phillips curve specification, which adds the unemployment rate and noncore inflation.   Each 
forecast from these equations is obtained by regressing inflation on a constant and the 
explanatory variable(s) over a 15 year sample that ends in the period prior to the forecast.  The 
estimated equation is then used to forecast next period’s inflation.  The specification used here is 
the same as that used by BR (2005). 
  Timing issues become important when the regression based forecasts are compared to the 
survey forecasts.  Both ABW and BR include the latest inflation data on the right hand side when 
estimating equations to predict future inflation.
14  As inflation data are released with a lag, this 
means that the forecasts obtained from the regressions will be based on more information than 
the survey respondents had when they made their forecasts.  Note that the difference is less than 
one quarter, as survey respondents have access to monthly data but are being asked to forecast 
quarterly inflation once a quarter (SPF) or annual inflation every month (Michigan).   More 
specifically, for the Michigan survey, this paper uses data from the final reading in the third 
month of the quarter, which is released at the end of that month.  Since CPI data tend to be 
released around the middle of the month, the quarterly Michigan forecast used here is likely to be 
based on the monthly inflation rate for the first two months of the quarter.  This is quite good, 
since the last month of data has a low weight in calculating the quarterly average inflation rate.  
Things are different for the SPF survey, as it is conducted once a quarter and is released in the 
middle of the middle month of the quarter.  Thus, depending upon survey and data release dates, 
SPF survey respondents may or may not have information about CPI inflation in the first month 
                                                 
13 However, such an opinion was not universally held.  For an alternative, see Smith (2005).   
14 BR do not compare the equation based forecasts with the survey forecasts. 14 
 
of the quarter.  In order to avoid stacking the deck against the survey respondents, this paper 
excludes quarter t information from the right hand side of the estimated equations.  In the second 
specification in Table 3A, for instance, inflation from quarter t to quarter t+4 is predicted using 
inflation data through quarter t-1.  Thus, the timing convention here differs from both ABW and 
BR. 
  The results turn out to be very different from these studies as well, though not because of 
the timing convention.   Using lagged CPI inflation to predict headline inflation leads to the 
smallest root mean squared error in Table 3.  According to the Diebold-Mariano-West (or 
DMW) test,
15 these forecasts are better than the SPF forecasts at the 1 percent level.  Forecasts 
from the Phillips curve specification are better than the SPF forecasts at the 10 percent level.  
Forecasts based on lagged core inflation are the third most accurate (out of seven), though the 
associated RMSE is close to that for the SPF forecasts.  This similarity is not surprising given the 
results above suggesting that the SPF forecasts can be well described as a linear combination of 
lagged core CPI inflation data.   The Michigan survey forecasts, the forecasts from the 
unobserved components stochastic volatility model and the random walk specification bring up 
the rear, with RMSEs that are just above 2 percent. 
  For comparison, the lower panel of Table 3 presents results from a sample of the same 
size which ends at the end of 2002.  Here we replicate the results found by ABW and BR.  In 
particular, as pointed out by ABW, the SPF survey does best of all, and the Michigan survey has 
almost exactly the same RMSE.  The forecasts from the SPF survey are better than those based 
on lagged core inflation at the 1 percent level and are better than those from the Phillips curve 
specification at the 5 percent level (DMW test again).  And consistent with BR, forecasts of 
headline CPI inflation based on core CPI inflation are better than those based on headline CPI 
data. 
  The RMSEs in the post 2002 sample are noticeably larger than the earlier sample for 
every specification in Table 3.  This reflects the increase in high frequency noise in CPI inflation 
over this period.  Even so, the deterioration in the SPF forecast is surprising.  Since 2003, 
professional forecasters are doing worse than a forecast based on headline inflation alone; here, it 
is worth pointing out that the latter specification has almost no ability to explain inflation within 
sample (in terms of the adjusted-R
2).   This evidence makes one wonder whether the SPF 
                                                 
15 See West (2006). 15 
 
forecasters’ apparent decision to pay little or no attention to the non-core inflation data in recent 
years and to continue to place a large weight on the core inflation data was motivated by a desire 
to predict headline inflation more accurately or in pursuit of some other objective. 
BR (2005) provide an interesting rationale for what might be going on: 
 
“Another Greenspan innovation, which is rarely mentioned but is likely to prove 
durable, is the way he has focused both the Fed and the financial markets on core, 
rather than headline, inflation.  This aspect of Federal Reserve monetary policy 
contrasts sharply with the concentration on headline inflation at the ECB and to 
the stated inflation targets of most other central banks, which are rarely core 
rates.” 
 
Perhaps there is more than one realizes to the Blinder and Reis argument that Chairman 
Greenspan turned public attention towards the core inflation data.  Could it be that the SPF 
forecasters have followed the Fed and switched their attention to forecasting core CPI, even 
though they are being asked to forecast headline CPI? 
  Table 4 presents some evidence that is consistent with this hypothesis.  It shows what 
happens (over the period since the beginning of 2003) when the SPF forecast of headline CPI 
inflation is treated as a forecast of core CPI inflation.  For comparison, forecasts from the other 
specifications in Table 3 are also included, with the exception of the one that uses headline CPI 
on the right hand side.   As can be seen, the SPF forecast of headline inflation turns out to be a 
pretty good predictor of core inflation.  It is better than the random walk specification at the 1 
percent level.  And the RMSE of the SPF forecast is slightly better than that obtained when core 
CPI inflation is used to predict future core inflation, though the difference is nowhere near 
statistically significant.  The Phillips curve specification turns out to be the best, though it 
outperforms the SPF forecast only at the 10 percent level.  The Michigan survey is the worst by a 
wide margin.  This is not a big surprise, as the respondents are being asked to predict headline –
and not core--inflation; the surprise is that the SPF survey does so well. 
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Section 4: Conclusions 
The evidence suggests that the inflation process has changed in recent years. The autoregressive 
representation of CPI inflation shows a noticeable decline in the sum of the coefficients on 
lagged inflation over time and by the end of the sample lagged inflation data have no predictive 
power for future inflation at all.  If, instead, Stock and Watson’s unobserved-component-
stochastic-volatility specification is imposed on the data, the change shows up as a noticeable 
increase in the variance of the high frequency component.  While it may be hard to determine the 
correct representation of the data, either kind of change should lead survey respondents to place 
less weight on recent inflation data when predicting future inflation. 
Households do not appear to have learned about this change in the inflation process, as 
they do not appear to have changed the way in which they form expectations of inflation.   
Historically, households have placed a large weight on recent inflation data when forming 
inflation expectations, and they continue to do so now.  The effects of this mistake show up in a 
marked deterioration in forecasting performance, as the Michigan forecasts have gone from 
being about the most accurate to the least accurate. 
There is more reason to believe that professional forecasters have changed the way that 
they forecast inflation.  They now seem to react very little, if at all, to noncore inflation data; at 
the same time, though, they do not appear to have changed the way they react to core inflation 
data.   However, the changes in the inflation process documented above suggest that this strategy 
may be problematic, an assessment that is borne out by the noticeable deterioration in the relative 
forecasting performance of the professionals.  These results suggest that professionals are 
placing too much weight on recent core inflation, just as households are placing too much weight 
on recent headline inflation.   
The evidence presented above is also consistent with the interpretation that the 
professionals have stopped worrying about headline inflation and are now focusing on core CPI 
inflation.  To the extent that this is a recent switch, and possibly one encouraged by then-
Chairman Greenspan’s advocacy of the core inflation rate, it suggests that analyses which use 
data from expectations surveys to determine how agents learn about the economy need to 
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ΣPi  + ΣDPi = 0** 
 
 3.26









ΣPi is the sum of the coefficients on realized CPI inflation, ΣDPi is the sum of the coefficients on the realized 
inflation terms multiplied by the dummy D94, which equals 0 until the end of 1993 and 1 after that.  HAC standard 
errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
1 denotes significant at 1 percent; 
5 denotes significant at 5 percent; 
10 denotes significant at 10 percent. 
 
* F statistic for null that all 8 DPi terms can be excluded from the equation.  
 
**Chi-square statistic for null that the sum of the coefficients on inflation is equal to zero in the second half of the 
sample. 
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Table 2. Projections of 1-year-ahead SPF Inflation Forecast 
Sample: 1981Q3-2009Q3 
 
    On Headline Inflation    On Core Inflation 
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ΣPi is the sum of the coefficients on realized CPI inflation, ΣDPi is the sum of the coefficients on the realized 
inflation terms multiplied by the dummy D94, which equals 0 until the end of 1993 and 1 after that.  HAC standard 
errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
1 denotes significant at 1 percent; 
5 denotes significant at 5 percent; 
10 denotes significant at 10 percent. 
 
* F statistic for null that all 8 DPi terms can be excluded from the equation.  
 
**Chi-square statistic for null that the sum of the coefficients on inflation is equal to zero in the second half of the 
sample.   21 
 
 
Table 3. Predicting 1-year-ahead headline CPI Inflation  
 




1 Better than the SPF forecast at 1 percent (Diebold-Mariano-West MSE test). 
 







B. Sample: 1996:Q2 – 2002:Q4 
(27 observations) 
 
  Notes:  
1 Better than lagged core inflation forecast at 1 percent 

















Mean  Error  -0.15 0.07 0.15 0.27 1.34 -0.52 0.30 
Root Mean 
Square Error  2.05 1.41
1  1.59 1.47


















Mean  Error  -0.21 -0.64 -0.33 -0.22 1.29 -0.37 -0.28 
Root Mean 
Square Error  1.13 1.11
  0.99 0.98




Table 4. Predicting 1-year-ahead core CPI Inflation 
 











Michigan   SPF 
Mean Error  -0.09  -0.09  -0.12  1.05  -1.08  -0.26 
Root Mean 
Square Error  0.63 0.57 0.43





1 Better than Random walk forecast at 1 percent (DMW MSE test) 
10 Better than SPF forecast at 10%  
  Figure 1: 1-year-ahead Expected Inflation









SPF SurveyFigure 2: Projections on quarterly CPI inflation
15 year rolling sample
A. Dependent variable: 1-year-ahead realized CPI inflation
Sum of coefficients on inflation
2 standard error bands shown, based on HAC standard errors
















B. Dependent variable: 1-year-ahead expected inflation from Michigan Survey
Sum of coefficients on inflation
2 standard error bands shown, based on HAC standard errors















1.00Figure 3: Estimates from unobserved component stochastic volatility model for CPI inflation
1960Q1-2009Q3
Standard deviation of temporary innovations








Standard deviation of permanent innovations



















14Figure 4: Projections of the 1-year-ahead SPF inflation forecast
15 year rolling samples
A. On quarterly headline CPI inflation
Sum of coefficients on inflation
2 standard error bands shown, based on HAC standard errors

















B. On quarterly core CPI inflation
Sum of coefficients on inflation
2 standard error bands shown, based on HAC standard errors

















1.0Figure 5: Estimates from unobserved component stochastic volatility model for core CPI inflation
1960Q1-2009Q3
Standard deviation of temporary innovations








Standard deviation of permanent innovations












14Figure 6: Projections on quarterly CORE CPI inflation
15 year rolling samples
Dependent variable: 1-year-ahead realized CPI inflation
Sum of coefficients on inflation
2 standard error bands shown, based on HAC standard errors
















B. Dependent variable: 1-year-ahead realized core CPI inflation
Sum of coefficients on inflation
2 standard error bands shown, based on HAC standard errors
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